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FIVE CRISES 
 
  Ábhar mór bróid dom an léacht seo a thabhairt in onóir an Dochtúra 
T.K. Whitaker.  Agus mar bharr ar sin, é bheith i láthair anocht.  It is a great 
honour to be asked to deliver this lecture in honour of Dr. Ken Whitaker, all the 
more so in his presence.  Go maire sé an céad!  Or even better, as the Yiddish 
saying goes, ‘biz hundert un tsvantsik’.  
  Economic crises often prompt us to look backwards and, perhaps, to 
seek solace in parallels and precedents in the past.  Just as rising 
unemployment and fluctuating exchange rates in the late 1970s and 1980s 
prompted comparisons with the 1920s and 1930s, sovereign debt defaults in the 
1980s and early 1990s led to broadly reassuring analyses of earlier defaults.
1  
And the recent global financial crisis has again prompted comparisons with the 
Great Depression.  Barry Eichengreen and Kevin O’Rourke’s ‘Tale of Two 
Depressions’ prompted half a million hits on the electronic journal VoxEU in 
2009, while Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff’s This Time Is Different was a 
runaway best-seller.
2   Ireland’s current economic woes are this lecture’s 
pretext for a look backward at our earlier crises. 
In broadest outline, the economic history of independent Ireland has 
been one of underachievement for six decades or so, followed by remarkable 
catch-up between the late 1980s and the very recent past.  Figure 1a is one 
simple way of telling this story.  It describes the well-known convergence 
pattern across modern developed economies, whereby economic growth in a 
function of initial GDP per head.  In the era between independence and the  2
birth of the late Celtic Tiger in the late 1980s, Ireland’s poor performance is 
indicated by its outlying position, well below the convergence line indicated by 
broader European and New World experience.  However, when the data are 
extended to 2007, and using Irish GNP rather than GDP per head to allow for 
the well-known distortion (due to transfer pricing by multinational 
corporations) that GDP per head data introduces in the Irish case (Figure 1b), 
Ireland has jumped across the convergence line and is re-invented as an over-
performer.  The shift from under- to over-achiever was indeed remarkable. 
Before the crash, scores of books and articles from far and near focused 
on explaining the Irish economic miracle.
3  Some held, incorrectly, that the 
Irish economy had found a steady-state of rapid output and productivity 
growth; others acknowledged, correctly, that the achievement was genuine, 
though not for replication. Some commentators, such as the late Garret 
FitzGerald and Nick Crafts
4, linked our economic success to reduced 
dependence on the UK economy.  Now, just a few years later, others question 
the economic viability of an independent Ireland, as happened too in the 1980s 
and in the 1950s.  These contrasting assessments underline the uneven 
character of progress since the 1920s, and make the case for a longer-term 
perspective.  Is the present crisis, as some commentators have asserted, the 
‘worst crisis in our history’?  This paper is in part an attempt to answer that 
question.  Our focus will be on four previous crises.
5 
 
[Figures 1a and 1b about here]  3
 
The crises can be identified in various ways.  One convenient indicator is 
the annual movement in net emigration rates (Figure 2).  A caveat is that this 
ignores the role of pull factors; in mitigation, during the crises at issue here 
push factors dominated.  The first peak refers to the crisis brought about by 
the so-called Economic War (1934-38), when the net emigration rate peaked at 
10.4 per thousand in 1937.  The second, known in Ireland as the Emergency, 
coincided with World War II, and saw the net emigration rate peak at 15.5 per 
thousand in 1943.  Dating the third and fourth crises is not so straightforward.  
Emigration data suggest that the third straddled most of the 1950s, with the 
net outflow reaching a new high of 20.3 per thousand in 1958.  Some would 
date the origins of the fourth in the mid-1970s, but its impact on emigration 
can be seen only from the late 1970s.  It lasted a decade, with net emigration 
peaking at 12.5 per thousand in 1989.  The massive turnaround from a net 
immigration rate of 16.9 per thousand in 2006 to a net emigration rate of 7.7 
per thousand in 2010 imply that the downturn of the 2000s was the sharpest of 
all, and that it still has some way to go.  The collapse in the numbers of new 
private cars registered, another tell-tale marker, was also proportionately 
much greater since 2007 than in the mid-1980s or—a more far-fetched 
comparison—in 1956-57 (Figure 3).  And GDP data corroborate (see Figure 4).  
But more on that later: let us first discuss the other crises in turn. 
 














1. THE ECONOMIC WAR: 
The post-independence administrations of 1923-32 stressed fiscal and 
monetary rectitude, a small public sector, and the pursuit of comparative 
advantage.  This may have been good economics but it was bad politics, since 
it handed victory to Éamon de Valera’s Fianna Fáil in the general election of 
February 1932.  The changeover was one of those defining moments of 
twentieth-century Irish economic history.  It marked a shift toward import-
substituting industrialization, on which more later.  Let us focus first on the 
‘economic war’ which within a few months of taking office Fianna Fáil was 
waging against Britain.  The war began when Ireland defaulted on payments 
that were part of the Anglo-Irish Financial Agreement of 1923, and honoured as 
such by the previous government.  The payments, totalling the significant sum 
of £5 million per annum or about four per cent of national income, referred 
mainly to re-payments of loans made to Irish farmers—the so-called land 
annuities—before 1921.  Thus the economic war began with what was, in 
effect, a sovereign default,
6 and which was interpreted as such from the outset 
by those hostile to the move. Ireland was by no means alone in defaulting at 
the time, however: one frequently cited study of sovereign default in the 
interwar period
7 found that 21 of 58 borrowers defaulted on their international 
bonds between 1930 and 1935; another four had already defaulted by 1929.  
At first the Irish government simply set aside the land annuities and 
related payments in suspense accounts, pending arbitration.  The British, 
through Dominions Secretary J. H. Thomas, reacted calmly but firmly to the  6
default.  Rejecting pleas from Dublin for independent arbitration on the 
legality of the payments, they simply recouped the sums due through special 
levies on Irish exports.  With no end to the dispute in sight, in early 1933 the 
Irish side unfroze the payments and began to divert them to meet fiscal needs 
and to compensate those most affected by the dispute.  This move helped to 
consolidate Fianna Fáil’s grip on power in the general election of 1933. 
At the outset some commentators hoped that Ireland might wield some 
market power, especially as purchaser of coal and seller of livestock.  A 
cartoon on the front page of the Irish Press on July 7
th 1932 illustrated the 
caption ‘Master Thomas bent his bow, aimed at a pigeon (Ireland) and shot a 
crow (British trade)’.  A second, also featuring J. H. Thomas, appeared on July 
20
th 1932. The cartoons were wishful thinking, and a memorandum penned by 
the formidable James J. McElligott
8 of the Department of Finance in December 
1936 compellingly rebutted claims that the burden of the duties on Irish 
exports had fallen ‘to a large extent at any rate’ on British consumers rather 
than Irish producers.  McElligott pointed to the wedge that the dispute had 
created between Irish and British wholesale agricultural prices, and noted that 
the British would have countered any increase in the cost of Irish imports by 
turning to alternative sources.  As further evidence of where the incidence of 
the tariffs fell, the same memorandum also noted how the first coal-cattle 
pact—a limited arrangement agreed in 1936—had increased wholesale prices in 
Ireland.   7
De Valera saw things differently, envisaging the country being ‘driven 
back to the first duty of agriculture—to feed our own people’.  As a result, he 
said, ‘our hungry people will get food’
9. There was a political aspect to this, 
since those strong farmers who lost most by the Economic War were less likely 
to vote for Fianna Fáil anyway.  For them the mid-1930s marked a nadir in 
welfare in an independent Ireland.
10 
De Valera’s vision would have proved disastrous in the long run.  Yet 
fortune favoured Fianna Fáil. The Economic War reduced living standards, but 
ended in a net, albeit unanticipated economic gain.  The value of the 
concessions gained through the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1938 exceeded the 
losses incurred since 1934, because in exchange for a once-off payment of £10 
million, Britain agreed to write off all future annuity payments.
11 Britain also 
returned the so-called Treaty ports which would allow Ireland to sit out a war 
that seemed inevitable.  The ‘default’ thus ended well and, because it was not 
about solvency and markets did not expect a repeat, its impact on bond yields 
was minimal.  Raising the funds necessary to honour the 1938 Agreement was 
relatively painless.  And so Éire, which had lost the battles, ended up winning 
the Economic War.  Lemass, not ordinarily given to rabble-rousing, crowed, ‘It 
is a complete waste of time to discuss who began [the Economic War]. The 
important thing is that we won it’.
12  The reason is clear; the much greater 
threat of Nazi Germany prompted the British to be generous. The one sensitive 
element from an Irish standpoint was a clause in the 1938 agreement that 







The Economic War helped to change the size and composition of Fianna 
Fáil’s electoral support.  Between 1932 and 1938 its share of the total vote rose 
from 44.5 to an all-time high of 51.9 per cent.  Cheap food, a by-product of the  9
Economic War, and a post-1932 industrialization drive that created 
considerable employment, benefited workers in the towns and cities most.  
And so in Dublin Fianna Fáil’s share of the vote rose sharply, from 34.1 per cent 
to 47.3 per cent.  By 1944, for all of De Valera’s attachment to bucolic values, 
his party was more popular in the capital than in the country as a whole. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
2. THE EMERGENCY:  
  One of the first acts of the government on the outbreak of war in 
September 1939 was to declare a state of emergency and pass an Emergency 
Powers Act.  Hence the ‘Emergency’, and it was a real emergency.  First of all, 
it was a political emergency, with much intimidation from representatives of 
three of the warring parties.  Winston Churchill and David Gray, the U.S. 
ambassador, were notoriously unsympathetic, taking turns in their attempts to 
force Ireland off the fence.  Had the country been seriously divided on the 
issue of neutrality, the situation would have been much more critical.
13 
But let us focus on the economics.  Fears of mass unemployment were 
very real.  A hastily-prepared confidential ‘Report of Inter-Departmental 
Committee on the Probable Effect on Employment of the Complete Isolation of 
Eire’ predicted that a complete end to international trade (including cross-
border trade) from July 1
st 1940 would increase unemployment by from 60,000 
to 76,000 immediately, and that an additional ten thousand would lose their  10
jobs in the following two months.  This calculation was on the basis that the 
stocks of materials and fuel available were sufficient only for three months of 
normal activity.  Obviously, the situation was bound to deteriorate rapidly 
thereafter, as stocks of materials and fuel ran out. Were autarky to last longer 
and the economy forced to rely entirely on native resources, the committee 
estimated that ‘the additional unemployment which might be expected at this 
point would be approximately 161,000 persons’.  The report excluded the 
impact on employment in agriculture and fisheries, on the liberal professions, 
and on the self-employed.
14 
The strategy of import-substituting industrialization [ISI] pursued since 
1932 had not prepared the economy for the degree of self-reliance dictated by 
the war, because it still depended on Britain for fuel and producer goods.  
Ireland was now faced with a neighbour with considerable monopsony and 
monopoly power and determined to supply only those raw materials deemed 
necessary for agricultural production [so that Ireland could continue to supply 
Britain with food].  By the summer of 1940 British coal exporters were 
demanding payment prior to delivery.  Ireland’s representative in London tried 
to convince the colliery owners that ‘if they want to maintain their monopoly 
in future, [not] to take advantage of the present position in the manner 
proposed’. 
In visits to London when war was imminent John Leydon, secretary of 
Seán Lemass’s Department of Industry and Commerce, ‘was assured that there 
would be no difficulty in respect of shipping, [that] we would be on the same  11
footing as Britain’.  Yet from the start of the war the British authorities refused 
to provide any tonnage for Irish bulk cargoes from abroad, even though this 
traffic had relied heavily on British shippers before the war.  The government 
accordingly created Irish Shipping Ltd. and bought or chartered fifteen second-
hand ships to service Irish trade. Two of these were sunk by U-boats in 1943, 
including the biggest, the Irish Pine (5,621 tons), with the loss of thirty-three 
lives.  A dozen other Irish-registered ships were lost between 1940 and 1943, 
mostly in the Irish Sea, with a total loss of nearly one hundred lives.
15 
  The Emergency put a new gloss on Dean Swift’s famous admonition to 
‘burn everything that comes from England except its coal’.  At the outset there 
was talk of an annual eight million tons of turf to make good the shortfall in 
British coal supplies.  Turf production did increase significantly, but such a 
target was never on.  Although the turf campaign waged during war years 
represented considerable mobilization, the Emergency proved, if proof were 
needed, that turf was not a viable long-run substitute for coal.  Its bulk and its 
location in remote regions were against it. Railway historian Peter Rigney has 
referred to the country being ‘a gigantic outdoor fuel laboratory’, with the 
railway network acting as the national grid for turf.
16  The country would have 
been in direr straits without bogs; none the less, the lack of fuel, more than 
perhaps anything else, had a serious impact on the Irish economy and on health 
and living standards. 
Meanwhile there was the hope that the war would make the tariff 
reductions envisaged under the 1938 Agreement a dead letter, but the British  12
kept up the pressure on this score.  Within days of the outbreak of war John 
Leydon ordered the secretary of the Prices Commission established in the wake 
of the agreement to suspend all tariff reviews without further notice.  His 
disclosure of the suspension to the British Board of Trade provoked the 
response that it was ‘a little arbitrary to disband the whole machine and 
deprive us of the major benefit which we obtained in the commercial sphere 
from the Agreement of last year’.  Leydon replied that the measure was merely 
temporary.  However, Sean McEntee, the most conservative member of De 
Valera’s cabinet, wanted to proceed with tariff reviews, while Lemass, now in 
charge of the all-important Department of Supplies, did not.
17 
Much more ominously, the British demanded that storage and 
transshipment facilities be made available in Ireland in return for trade 
concessions.  A memo penned by McElligott on behalf of other departmental 
secretaries unhelpfully noted that, setting aside the political risks involved, 
‘there would appear to be definite economic advantage for this country if 
trans-shipment facilities were possible.’ But German ambassador Dr. Eduard 
Hempel had anticipated all this.  Barely a month after the outbreak of war, he 
noted that ‘pressure might be brought on Ireland to allow her ports to be used 
for a re-export trade to Great Britain’.  Don’t risk it, he advised. Should 
Germany learn that this was happening, ‘they would find it very difficult not to 
regard all cargo coming to Ireland with suspicion, and they might find it very 
difficult not to take measures to prevent imports coming to Ireland’.
18 
Fortunately, the British did not persist with their demands.  13
Inevitably incomes were squeezed.  Real earnings fell significantly.  In 
distribution, manufacturing, and construction they dropped by a mighty 26-39 
per cent between 1938 and 1944; in agriculture the fall was 9 per cent; in the 
public service it was 24 per cent; and in the higher professions it was one-third 
between 1938 and 1943 (Figure 5).  Those on middling incomes were worst 
affected.
19  Even by the standards of today, these were big falls.  Farmers, who 
bore the brunt of Economic War, fared best, but there was no golden age for 
them as there had been during the Great War. 
Surprisingly, given the predictions made on the eve of the war, 
unemployment fell during the Emergency.  The decline was progressive and 
affected all sectors.  The rise in emigration was the main reason for this, but 
wage moderation, an increase in the size of the defence forces, and job sharing 
schemes also helped.
20  As Figure 2 implies, the immediate impact of the 
outbreak of war was a significant return migration to Ireland, but in the 
following years the net outflow to Britain grew, peaking at new high of 46,000 
in 1943.  Emigration to Britain during the war was controlled but most who 
wanted to emigrate did so.  The increase in emigration is readily accounted for 
by the widening gap between wages in Britain (where they were rising) and 
Ireland (where they were falling).
21  
Nevertheless other data imply a bleak picture of economic conditions 
between 1939 and 1945. The supply of basics such as potatoes, eggs, sugar, 
milk, and meat were adequate, but butter was rationed, and tea, margarine, 
and imported fruit were extremely scarce or virtually unattainable.  Health  14
worsened as reflected in data on infant mortality and deaths from TB.  Figure 6 
shows that the decline in the death rate from TB was interrupted, while there 
was a big increase in the infant mortality rate in 1943 and 1944. The rise in 
infant mortality, mainly due to gastroenteritis, was particularly severe in 
Dublin. 
 
[Figures 5 and 6 about here] 
 
The economic hardship initially produced more anti-Fianna Fáil feeling 
than at any stage since 1932 but there was no meltdown in support.  True, the 
Labour Party won most seats on Dublin City council in 1942, and Fianna Fáil’s 
vote in the general election of 1943 fell by nearly one-fifth to 41.9 per cent.  
However, in 1944 its share was back up to 48.9 per cent.
22  This reflected 
popular support for neutrality and confidence in De Valera’s ability to maintain 
it. 
Seán Lemass ran his own version of command economy through his 
Department of Supplies.  Coping with the Emergency required a good deal of 
improvisation and imagination.  A short account of the leather and shoe 
manufacturing during the Emergency may be useful here.
23  After 1932 Ireland 
quickly built up a footwear sector, and on the eve of the war the country had 
become virtually self-sufficient in footwear.  In 1940 the Free State produced 
4.5 million pair of leather footwear and 1 million pair of rubber footwear.  Only 
a quarter of a million pairs were imported.  But this was not self-sufficiency,  15
because although Irish tanneries produced most of the necessary leather, only 
about half of the hides they used were home-produced, and virtually none of 
the chemicals, nails, and other components.  Naturally, the raw materials for 
rubber boots and shoes were all imported. 
A United Kingdom prohibition on the export of hides in March 1941 
created panic in the industry, but the government negotiated an agreement 
which allowed production to be maintained at about two-thirds of the norm.  
This led to discussions between the Department of Supplies and the industry in 
order to ensure that the production of ‘essential types of footwear’ be 
prioritized.  It would also be necessary to reduce variety.  The department 
controlled the producers through its allocation of leather to their factories.  
Once quarterly quotas of bottom and upper leather for the different factories 
had been decided, each factory was informed of its allocation and requested to 
declare the quantity of ‘essential types of footwear’ it proposed to produce 
and how much leather it required for that purpose.  The declarations ensured 
that a reasonable proportion of factory output was allocated to priority 
requirements. The Secretary of the Tanners’ Federation then arranged 
deliveries.  A further check on production figures ensured that guarantees were 
met.  An internal history of how the industry was managed noted that control 
was based on ‘the voluntary acceptance by the trade interests of the 
restrictions imposed’.  The leather and footwear industry was in a privileged 
situation in this respect.  Controlling production in the clothing industry and 
the textile distributive trade was much more challenging, and the costs of  16
monitoring output in the latter cases were much higher, with the threat of 
prosecution often replacing voluntarism and moral suasion.  
The Emergency also produced a defining moment in Irish banking history.  
Until then, Ireland’s lack of a central bank had not worried its joint-stock 
banks; on the contrary, they did not relish the idea.  For over a century the 
Bank of Ireland had played the role of quasi-central bank, while looking on the 
Bank of England as its friend in need.  Just a few days before the outbreak of 
war a delegation from College Green traveled to London for reassurance about 
the availability of foreign exchange and the free repatriation of Irish bank 
assets held in London.  In what must have been a difficult moment for the Irish 




notwithstanding the long and intimate relations between the two 
institutions he was not prepared to commit the Bank of England by 
promising to come to the assistance of the Bank of Ireland in an 
emergency of the nature under discussion.  As an ordinary banking 
transaction there would be no question whatever about making an 
advance to the Bank, but in an emergency situation there was an 
important principal (sic) involved.  The Bank of England looked upon 
Eire as a Dominion…  Mr. Norman stressed the view that the Bank 
‘whose centre of gravity was in Eire’ should look to their own Treasury 
or the Currency Commission to help them over difficult periods.  Sir 
John [Keane, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Ireland] pointed out that 
the position in Eire did not admit of a solution in that way, as the 
Treasury came to the Bank when it was short of funds, and the Currency 
Commission was not a lender of the last resort.  Mr. Norman then urged  17
that as Eire was a separate political entity it should have a Central Bank 
of its own. 
 
And so it took the Emergency and Montagu Norman to persuade the Bank 
of Ireland to switch its loyalty fully to the new state, and for the other joint 
stock banks to appreciate the need for an Irish central bank.  The Central Bank 
Act followed in 1942. 
 




3. THE LOST DECADE OF THE 1950s:  
In Europe generally the 1950s were a decade of growth and 
convergence. In Ireland, by contrast, this was the lost decade, the period of 
underachievement and self-doubt that prompted recently-appointed secretary 
of the Department of Finance, Ken Whitaker, to remark that ‘after 35 years of 
native government people are asking whether we can achieve an acceptable 
degree of economic progress’.  The resonances with the present are clear. 
Ireland was a true outlier.  During the war it had been the slowest-
growing of the unoccupied non-belligerents, and its recovery in 1945-50 was 
weakest of all European economies with the exception of Spain.  Again its 
growth record in 1950-58 was the worst in western Europe. The convergence 
regression in Figure 7 is an alternative way of telling the story. 
  18
[Figure 7 about here] 
 
 
Sean Lemass has been described as an ‘instinctive’ free trader
25, but 
there was a time when he saw ISI as a means of reducing unemployment and 
developing the economy.  It seemed to work in the 1930s while the economy 
was adjusting to a new protectionist equilibrium, but Lemass’s faith in ISI was 
severely tested thereafter.  The minutes of informal meetings between him 
and leaders of the Federation of Irish Manufacturers (forerunner of today’s 
IBEC) betray a recurring tetchiness on Lemass’s part.  In February 1945, for 
example, he asked that the Federation ‘put on record that, of the very large 
number of plans received relating to export development, very few have been 
received from firms which might be considered as wholly national’.  And he 
warned that there would be no return to protecting cloth imports until ‘Irish 
mills have reached a satisfactory standard, not only of quality but also of 
variety and price in addition to quality.  Cheap cloths for the working-man’s 
type of suit are not being made here.’  It was also in 1945 that the Department 
of Industry and Commerce first sought to combine ISI with some export-
subsidizing industrialization (ESI), only to have its plans scuppered by the 
Department of Finance.
26  
  When manufacturers complained against the temporary lifting of tariffs 
on footwear and clothing in 1947 Lemass testily asked whether they ‘would 
advocate going without finished goods which are in short supply?’, adding that 
the government was determined to ‘get rid of a sellers’ market’, which could 
be achieved ‘only by an increase in the volume of goods within the country, be  19
they imported or manufactured.’  Lemass then stated that ‘most of our pre-war 
tariffs had been too high and that quantitative restrictions were of a variable 
quality’.
27  Some months later when a representative of the clothing industry 
complained that it was impossible to sell their wares because of the quality of 
imported raw materials, Lemass retorted testily by asking ‘if the manufactures 
wished him to restrict imports to enable them to sell what the public did not 
want.’
28 
Back in power in 1957, Lemass immediately began to warn industrialists 
of the prospect of Ireland joining a European free trade area, and in early 1958 
bluntly stated that tariff protection was no longer ‘the main instrument of 
industrial policy’
29.  His frustration at industry’s reluctance to go beyond 
producing or assembling foreign goods under license, without giving a thought 
to exports, was shared by William Norton, leader of the Labour Party and 
Tánaiste both in 1948-51 and 1954-57. 
The crisis of the 1950s, as commentary at the time increasingly 
recognized, had its roots in the policies of the 1930s.  Instead of generating an 
expanding, self-sustaining economy, less reliant on the land, ISI had resulted in 
an inefficient, highly protected manufacturing sector producing a small range 
of products in small plants with short production runs.  
  From the early 1950s on, as the failure of the domestic market to deliver 
sustainable growth became increasingly obvious, policy shifted cautiously away 
from ISI.  But a return to the policies of the 1920s was not very palatable 
either.  The promotion of export-oriented subsidiaries of multinationals was  20
politically attractive, since it did not threaten existing indigenous firms 
directly, at least in the short run.  By 1955 Irish delegations were busily seeking 
foreign investment in Germany, the U.S., and elsewhere, and in 1956 the inter-
party government led by John A. Costello of Fine Gael enacted a fifty per cent 
tax remission for a fixed period on export-derived profits.
30  Lemass trumped 
Costello’s concessions with new incentives (one hundred per cent tax 
exemptions on export-derived profits, and complete freedom to repatriate 
profits) in 1958. The success of such measures was predicated on expected Irish 
membership of a broader European free trade area. 
Why did manufacturers not offer stouter resistance to trade 
liberalization?  One reason is that its abysmal record in providing employment 
weakened its political influence.  A second is that Britain’s plan to create a 
European Free Trade Area left it little choice; it was inconceivable that Britain 
should join and Ireland remain aloof.
31  Thus by 1956-57 manufacturers were 
already reconciled to the prospect of trade liberalization. And so in late 1957 
their president of the Federation of Irish Manufacturers proposed a ‘re-
adaptation fund for Irish industry’, on the lines envisaged in the Treaty of 
Rome’s clauses on regional aid. 
An economic nadir was reached in 1956.  The prevailing gloom was 
intensified by Finance Minister Gerard Sweetman’s draconian fiscal response to 
a balance of payments disequilibrium that would have righted itself in time.
32  
The publication of the preliminary 1956 census returns on June 2
nd - which 
showed a sharp fall in population since 1951 - deepened the pre-existing  21
gloom. ‘Obviously, our whole economy, industrial as well as agricultural, is 
badly in need of a fresh stimulus’, lamented the Irish Press.  For the Irish 
Independent the census figures represented ‘a severe shock to confidence’.  
Sceptical of the capacity of capital investment policies, industrialisation and 
urbanisation to deliver the goods, the Independent’s rather unimaginative 
editorial asked, ‘is it possible that we shall re-discover the primary importance 
of agriculture as the basis for prosperity and, if only indirectly, population, and 




  Thanks in part to Sweetman’s fiscal squeeze, Fianna Fáil won the 
general election of March 1957 handily.
33  De Valera’s new appointee as 
Minister for Finance, James Ryan, was greeted by a sharp and apocalyptic 
memorandum from his departmental secretary.  ‘I felt an obligation’, Ken 
Whitaker recently reminisced, ‘to try and put things right. I was bold enough to  22
write a note to the then [Finance] Minister of the day saying if we continued 
the way we were, it wouldn't be long before we'd have to ask England to take 
us back’.
34  Whitaker’s note, called simply ‘The Irish Economy, 1957’, set out 
starkly the message later elaborated on in Economic Development: 
 
It is accepted on all sides that we have come to a critical and 
decisive point in our economic affairs. It is only too clear that the 
policies we have hitherto followed have not resulted in a viable 
economy.  It is equally clear that we face economic decay and the 
collapse of our political independence if we elected to shelter 
permanently behind a protectionist blockade.  For this would mean 
accepting that our costs must permanently be higher than those of 
other countries, both in industry and large sections of agriculture.  That 
would be a policy of despair…The effect of any policy which entailed 
relatively low living standards here would be to sustain and stimulate 
the outflow of emigrants and make it impossible to preserve the 26 
Counties as an economic entity.
35  
 
The message sunk in.  In the following months Ireland joined both the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and in July 1958 all remaining 
restrictions on foreign investment in manufacturing were removed.   
Emigration reached its highest level since independence in 1958.  
Recovery and the beginnings of significant economic growth in 1958-59 had 
probably much more to do with the end to recession in the United Kingdom 
than frequently-cited factors such as economic planning or Seán Lemass’s 
accession as Taoiseach.
36 Figure 8 corroborates.   23
The policy shifts described above ensured that growth would continue.  
For the following two decades the rate of emigration fell, with only minor 
interruptions, and population began to grow again – modestly at first but 
eventually making Ireland one of the fastest-growing populations in Europe. 
The Irish economy had begun to catch up, but convergence with the leading 
economies of Europe was still far in the future. 
 
[Figure 8 about here] 
 
 
4. THE 1980s: DURATION, IMPACT 
  Misguided fiscal policy had exacerbated the difficulties of the mid-1950s, 
but it was entirely responsible for next crisis.  Both the Coalition government 
of 1973-77 and the Fianna Fáil government of 1977-81 sought to counter the 
deflationary effect of high oil prices and global recession by running ever-
bigger budgetary deficits, and generating an unsustainable increase in the 
national debt.  The National Development Plan 1977-1980 envisaged 
unprecedented growth rates stimulated by tax cuts and higher public spending, 
with the public finances restored through ‘revenue buoyancy, control of 
expenditure and an enhanced private sector contribution to the process of 
development’.
37  The gap between projection and outcome was alarming 
(Table 3). 
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[Table 3 about here] 
 
  Economists Colm McCarthy and Brendan Walsh were already warning in 
1980: ‘there are simply no macroeconomic policies that can be implemented in 
our current predicament that would move the country painlessly towards 
financial balance.  Time should not be wasted searching for means to avoid the 
unavoidable’.  Another voice raised against looming fiscal meltdown was that 
of T. K. Whitaker, who in May 1981 reminded fellow-members of Seanad 
Éireann that ‘the result of all the mistaken or wrongly-timed policies of the 
past decade, since deficit financing of current expenditure was first set up 
here as respectable, [could] be summed up by saying that, while it took 50 
years for the State debt to top £1,000 million, it has been multiplied eight 
times in as few years’. Not afraid to criticize the ‘magnanimous man’—
Taoiseach Jack Lynch—who had nominated him to the Seanad, Whitaker spoke 
of his duty ‘to speak his mind on matters within his competence’.  Some 
months later, in an attack on the crude Keynesianism underpinning Irish fiscal 
policy, he complained ‘how expansionary budgetary policies [had lost] much of 
their impact by spilling over into imports, creating huge deficits in the balance 
of payments and destabilising our public finances, rather than raising 
productive activity at home’.
38 
At that time the OECD still deemed ‘the very high level of 
unemployment’ the most serious problem facing the country, though it changed 
tune in 1982. It took the National Economic and Social Council until 1985,  25
however, to recognize ‘the consequences of continuing present policies’
39.  By 
then the situation had become so serious that maverick economist Raymond 
Crotty
40 counselled repudiation of the national debt, on the grounds that this 
would prevent future irresponsible governments from borrowing abroad.  
Political instability in the early 1980s delayed the necessary fiscal correction.  
Although this crisis had its origins in the mid-1970s, the medicine necessary to 
reduce the ratio of debt to GDP began to take effect only from 1983 on.  A Fine 
Gael and Labour coalition began the task, which was completed by a minority 
Fianna Fáil government, offered conditional support by Fine Gael through what 
came to be known, rather grandly, as the Tallaght strategy. Fiscal adjustment 
was complicated by the sluggish growth of the real economy.
41  Between 1979 
and 1986 private consumption barely rose and unemployment increased from 
6.8 per cent to 17.1 per cent, its highest level in the history of the state.  Due 
to renewed net outward migration, which did not peak until 1989, population 
declined in the late 1980s—the first such set-back in a generation. Net 
emigration fell fast in the early 1990s and would not turn significantly positive 
again until 2010. 
  The crisis ended in a series of severely contractionary budgets, and the 
first taste of the economic growth that would shape the Celtic Tiger.  Whether 
this episode represented an expansionary fiscal contraction—as claimed in a 
previous Whitaker lecture by European Central Bank governor Jean-Claude 
Trichet—is unlikely.  Contrary to Trichet’s claim that ‘the so-called “Ricardian” 
effect [was] more important than the “Keynesian” effect’, Patrick Honohan  26
and Brendan Walsh have found that such a neo-Ricardian interpretation ‘has an 
uphill struggle to find empirical support’ in Ireland in the 1980s, while Colm 
McCarthy has recently argued that in those years the cuts in capital 
expenditure were excessive and ‘tax rates… raised to self-defeating levels’.
42  
Thus Trichet’s assertion that the economy deflated itself out of recession in 
the 1980s contains few resonances for our current fiscal predicament.  The 
Irish economy had failed to grow at all between 1980 and 1986; then, spurred 
on by well-executed currency devaluations, a booming UK economy, a 
successful tax amnesty, and the beginnings of social partnership, in the 
following decade it would grow by more than five per cent annually.
43  Not a 
menu of recovery aids readily available today! 
 
 
5. THE CURRENT CRISIS 
  ‘Surely no other country in the rich world has seen its image change so 
fast’, mused The Economist in 2004.  But change comes in many versions.  The 
country dubbed ‘Europe’s shining light’ in 1997 is now ‘EuroDisasterLand, Part 
III’.
44 One cliché deserves another, and so the lag between Roy Foster’s mildly 
celebratory The Luck of the Irish and Kevin Lynch’s When the Luck of the Irish 
Ran Out was only two and a half years.
45  This is not the place to delve in any 
depth into the causes of the current crisis.  In one sense ours is just an extreme 
version of what a poorly regulated, perversely innovative, get-rich-quick 
banking culture produced in many economies. One might have hoped that the  27
European project had removed our freedom to score economic own goals—and 
so it seemed for a while—but economic integration did not extend to 
regulation.  And thus, the excesses of our banking system were facilitated by a 
home-spun regulatory regime ‘which was and was perceived to be excessively 
deferential and accommodating; insufficiently challenging and not persistent 
enough’.
46  The resultant fall has left us with a severely wounded economy that 
will require extraordinary measures to repair. Today Ken Whitaker’s old doubts 
about the viability of an independent Irish economy haunt us once more, and 
with a vengeance.  If we overcome this current crisis, is another—due again to 
the incompetence of those who rule us—inevitable in a few decades? 
  Here I discuss just one aspect of the present crisis, the link between 
unemployment and migration. The Celtic Tiger did not put an end to 
emigration.  Between 1991 and 2006 gross out-migration fluctuated narrowly 
between 25,300 and 36,000, before rising thereafter to 65,000 in 2010.  The 
big change was in immigration.  But the turnaround in net migration, from a 
peak of 71,000 in 2006 to -34,500 in 2010 has been much more dramatic than 
the turnaround in gross migration—and more dramatic than any of the previous 
four crises (see Figure 2). Most of the net migration during the downturn has 
been by non-nationals, and their departure has tempered the impact on 
domestic unemployment to an unprecedented extent. 
The speed of the migrant response has been remarkable (see Figure 9).  
Between 2008:2 and 2010:2 the number of non-nationals in the labour force 
dropped from 360,600 to 276,500.  Had it remained constant, as did the  28
number of nationals in the labour force, in 2010:2 non-nationals would have 
accounted for 37 per cent of the unemployed rather than the actual 16 per 
cent.
47  And that is why unemployment seems unlikely to reach the heights it 
did in the 1980s. 
 
[Figure 9 and Table 4 about here] 
 
6. BROAD SUNLIT UPLANDS? 
Unlike the periodic crises of classic business cycle theory, each of our 
Irish crises has tended to be sui generis.  True, the first two shared essentially 
political and post-colonial origins, while the first and third were in large part 
the consequences of post-independence policy choices.  It is also true that the 
economic damage wrought by the first three was linked in different ways to the 
smallness of the Irish economy, and its consequent lack of market power.  The 
message of all three was that no economy is an island, not even an island 
economy.  All five crises, moreover, were self-inflicted, bar one (the 
Emergency).  All inflicted net harm on living standards and economic welfare 
bar one (the Economic War).  But, apart from being products of a shared 
institutional framework, it is the uniqueness of each crisis that is most striking. 
Thus our current crisis is closely tied to collapse of the banking sector, but for 
earlier crises linked to Irish bank failures one must go back to the nineteenth 
century: and none of those crises inflicted significant, lasting damage on the 
real economy.
48    29
Is the current crisis the most serious of the lot?  The answer must be yes, 
although its eventual cost will depend on imponderables such as the timing and 
extent of, if any, the restructuring of our national debt.  The nearest in terms 
of reduced living standards is the Emergency.  Then the decline was in a 
context where the margin above hardship was much narrower than today and 
the scope for remedial action limited by wartime conditions.  That is why the 
Emergency, unlike the present crisis (so far), had a small but perceptible 
impact on health and mortality in the community at large.  It is also important 
to remember that, to some extent, the post-2007 losses merely cancelled out 
the unwarranted ‘hothouse’ gains of the previous five to seven years, although 
the eventual losses will surely go far beyond that.  On the other hand, if the 
current crisis has not impacted on mortality in general, one troubling by-
product already visible is the increase in a very different measure of health and 
wellbeing, the number of people who have taken their own lives.  The Celtic 
Tiger reduced the suicide rate; now, it seems, the numbers are up again.
49 
  Over a century ago George Santayana famously noted that ‘those who 
cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it’.  It is admittedly small 
consolation in our very grave current situation that none of our crises was the 
same, so that history was not repeating itself.  It would be good to conclude on 
a cheerful note, but I can think of no more hopeful way of ending these 
downbeat musings about our economic history than by quoting a wise 
nonagenarian, who had been through most of it, and who in late 2009 told a 
visiting American journalist: ‘Down the years, it has been seen that, although  30
we can be as wrongheaded as anybody else, we do have a capacity to recognize 
when we are doing wrong.  I mean tacitly we do so—we may not confess openly 
to our wrongdoing—but I think we learn from experience… and then we 
hopefully will re-emerge on the broad sunlit uplands.’
50  Let us hope Ken 
Whitaker is right, as he usually has been.  31
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TABLE 1. MAIN AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS BY DESTINATION, YEAR ENDING 
30th SEPTEMBER, 1936 (£) 
Item  Exports to UK  Exports 
Elsewhere 
UK share of Total 
[%] 
Cattle 6,058,000  289,000 
 4.6 
Sheep and Lambs  565,361  125 
 0.0 
Horses 963,000  271,000 
22.0 
Pigs and Other 488,000  9,000 
 1.8 
Mutton and Lamb  96,216  780 
 0.8 
Bacon 1,518,000  38,000 
 2.4 
Hams 78,000  13,000 
14.3 
Fresh Pork 322,000  4,000 
 1.2 
Turkeys (dead)  227,958  457 
 0.2 
Butter 1,642,000  177,000 
 9.7 
Eggs 849,000  161,000 
15.9 




TABLE 2. FOOTWEAR PRODUCTION IN IRELAND, 1940 AND 1944 (pairs) 
 
Leather footwear  Average Quarterly Production  
 1941  1944  + / - 
Men’s heavy  126,780  149,247 *  22,467 
Boys’ heavy  28,188  100,356 *  71,168 
Women’s and girls’ 
heavy 
16,515  68, 101 *  51,586 
Infants 57,711  50,933  -6,778 
Men’s light  206,217  108,653  -97564 
Boys’ light  109,167  40,277  -68890 
Women’s light  354,663  255,169  -99494 
Girls’ light  61,929  91,078  +29,149 
Sandals (rubber soled)  133,041  -   
Other classes  148,782  70,028  -78,754 
Total 1,125,693  933,842  -191,851 




TABLE 3. PLAN AND OUTCOME, 1979-1981 (%) 
 Projected  Outcome 
 1979  1980  1981  1979  1980 1981 
Unemployment 7.5  7.0  5.0  8.7  7.0 10.0 
Inflation 5.0  5.0  5.0  13.8  18.2 20.4 
PSBR 10.5  8.0  7.0  13.2  13.5 15.9 
GNP Growth  7.0  7.0  7.0  3.5  2.2 0.6 




TABLE 4. NET MIGRATION BY NATIONALITY [1,000s] 
Country/Region  2006  2007  2008  2009 2010 
Ireland 3.6  6.9  2.8  0 -14.4 
United Kingdom  7.7  3.6  4.6  1.5 -.2 
Other 15  7.6  3.5  4.4  3.1 -3.5 
EU 12  44.8  38.3  14.9  -16.6 -13.3 
Rest of World  10.2  15.1  11.9  4.1 -3.2 
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